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ABBREVIATIONS HEREIN 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants are sometimes 
hereinafter referred to as the "Andersons" or as "Mr." 
or "Mrs. Anderson". The Defendant-Respondent Mid 
Valley Investment is sometimes hereinafter referred 
to as "Mid Valley." The Defendant-Respondent Capitol 
Thrift and Loan Company is sometimes hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Capitol Thrift." The premises at 246 
South 11th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which Mrs. 
Anderson had her office, and which also contains sev-
eral apartments is sometimes hereinafter referred to 
as the "11th East commercial property." The premises 
at 474 East 12th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which 
the Andersons live is sometimes referred to as the 
"12th Avenue home". The 11th East commercial property 
and 12th Avenue home are hereinafter sometimes collect-
ively referred to as the "Andersons properties1 or the 
"properties". Pages of the record on appeal are here-
inafter referred to as "R [page]." Pages of the 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief on appeal are hereinafter 
referred to as "P.-App. Brief [page]." The Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are hereinafter referred to as "UTAH 
R. CIV. P." 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The nature of this case is two fold: first, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants1 action, as trustor, to invalidate 
the trustee's sale of Plaintiffs-Appellants' real prop-
erties; and, second, the counterclaim of the Defendant-
Respondent Mid Valley., as purchaser of these real 
properties at the trustee's sale, claiming their unlaw-
ful detainer by Plaintiffs-Appellants and, in addition, 
requesting bond forfeiture pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 
65A(c) for wrongful judicial restraint of Mid Valley's 
possession of one of these properties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
Complaint was entered against Plaintiffs-Appellants 
and in favor of Defendants-Respondents by the Hon. 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, Third District Court. 
Thereafter, the counterclaims of the Defendant-
Respondent Mid Valley were tried to the Hon. Stewart 
M. Hanson, Sr., Judge, Third District Court. Judge 
Hanson, Sr., dismissed Mid Valley's counterclaims but 
ordered Plaintiffs-Appellants to vacate that premises 
(the 110 East commercial property) which they had re-
tained in their possession, within 30 days of April 13, 
1975, because the summary judgment against them ousted 
them of any possessory rights, and ordered them to pay Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mid Valley $300.00 as they apparently had agreed to do 
in a written agreement between the parties (Ex. I-d). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley seeks the 
affirmance of Judge Hanson, Jr.'s, entry of summary 
judgment and with it the affirmance of Judge Hanson, 
Sr.'s, corollary order that Plaintiffs-Appellants vacate 
the 11th East commercial property within 30 days of 
April 13, 1975. 
Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley further seeks 
partial reversal of Judge Hanson, Sr.'s, judgment 
dismissing two of Mid Valley's counterclaims: first, 
Mid Valley's counterclaim of unlawful detainer of the 
11th East commercial property; and, second, Mid 
Valley's counterclaim for bond forfeiture pursuant to 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c). Upon reversal of the judgment 
dismissing these counterclaims, Mid Valley seeks the 
entry of a corresponding judgment in its favor and 
against the Plaintiffs-Appellants to the following 
effect: that Plaintiffs-Appellants were in unlawful 
detainer of the 11th East commercial property for a 
period of 20 days and that Mid Valley recover $660.00 
from Plaintiffs-Appellants constituting damages, trebled, 
resulting from this unlawful detainer; and that 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Rule 65A(c) bond in the amount 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of $300.00 be forfeited to Mid Valley, In. the alternative, 
the Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley seeks partial 
vacation of Judge Hanson, Sr.'s, judgment in the respects 
described above, and remand to the lower court for a 
determination of the damage suffered by Mid Valley. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The following material facts are in addition 
to those of Plaintiff-Appellants fact statement: 
During a long period preceding at the time 
of, and immediately following the disputed trustee's 
sale, the Anderson's were represented by legal counsel 
who advised them on matters regarding the sale. See, 
reference to stipulation of counsel on postponement of 
sale, at R 40; Affidavit of James B. Mason, at R 48, 
to the effect that he spoke with Anderson's counsel 
before accepting Mid Valley's payment for the proper-
ties; Affidavits of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at R 
60-61, David Doxey, at R 65, Austin Belnap, at R 67, 
Helen and Ross Broadbent, at R 70, all to the effect 
that Anderson's counsel conferred and advised on 
various aspects of the sale. 
The Andersons were acquainted with the 
mechanics, operation and effect of default notices 
and a trustee's sale, having brought and subse-
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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quently having dismissed with prejudice an action 
challenging the default notices and proposed 
trustee's sale which preceded the presently disputed 
notice and sale. Anderson v. Cape Trust Co*, Civil 
No. 223415, Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
(order and dismissal of this case are found at R 40-42) • 
The notice of the now-disputed January 16, 
1975, sale gave the correct time and place of the sale. 
R 52. The Andersons failed to attend because Mr. 
Anderson was told the wrong place by Mrs. Anderson. 
Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 78. 
The purchaser at the sale, Mid Valley In-
vestment, was a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice, having learned of the sale through official 
means, having paid value and having no notice of 
infirmity of the sale. Affidavit of Ross and Helen 
Broadbent, at R 69. 
On the morning following the sale, the 
trustee was advised by the Andersons1 counsel that a 
trustee's deed should be issued to Mid Valley since 
the Andersons still did not have the money to tender. 
Affidavit of James B. Mason, at R 48. Mid Valley 
paid for the properties by cashier's check and re-
corded their trustee's deed within 24 hours of the 
sale. Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent at R 70. 
On the afternoon of January 17, 19 75, the 
day following the sale, Mid Valley's representatives 
met with the Andersons and the Andersons' counsel in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the counsel's office. There the Andersons, either 
personally or through their counsel, offered to 
repurchase the property from Mid Valley. Affidavit 
of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at R 60; Affidavit of 
Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 70; cf., Testimony 
of Mr. Anderson, at R 19 4 (which testimony, however, 
was not before the court when summary judgment was 
granted and cannot here be considered in reviewing 
the summaryjudgment determination). After Mid 
Valley rejected this offer, the parties validly 
entered into a rental, lease or occupancy agree-
ment covering the Anderson properties. Defendant's 
Exhibit I-d and R 24; Amended Findings of Fact No. 2, 
at R 143; see, Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, 
at R 60; Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at 
R 71; Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 77-78. 
This agreement, drawn in the hand of the Andersons1 
counsel, required the Andersons to vacate the 11th 
East commercial property by January 31, 19 75, and to 
pay $150 a month rent for the 12th Avenue home until 
April 17, 19 75, at which time they were also to vacate 
this property. Defendant's Exhibit I-d and R 24. 
In respect of the 12th Avenue home, the 
Andersons paid to Mid Valley $150.00 covering the 
rent from January 18 to February 18, 1975. 
-6-
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Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 71. 
Thereafter they failed to pay anything further and 
they remain in possession of the home by virtue of a 
bond staying Judge Hanson, Sr.'s order that they 
vacate the premises within 30 days of April 13, 1975. 
In respect of the 11th East commercial prop-
erty/ the Andersons failed to vacate the premises on 
January 31, 19 75, as specified by their written agree-
ment. Instead, they negotiated with Mid Valley for 
additional time (Testimony of Ross Broadbent, at 
R 178-80) and then, on February 10, 1975, obtained 
a temporary restraining order preventing, among other 
things, the removal of their possessions from these 
commercial premises pending a hearing. R 10-11. 
At this time, the Andersons posted a $300 bond pursuant 
to UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c). Amended Findings of Fact 
No. 9, at R 144. This order was superseded by the 
court's further order, in the nature of a preliminary 
injunction, issued February 18, 19 75. R 13-14. This 
superseding order continued the Anderson's in posses-
sion of their former office in the 11th East com-
mercial property during the pendency of the litigation, 
"upon the posting and filing by the Plaintiffs [-Appellants] 
of a $7,500 corporate or cash bond." Id. The An-
dersons never posted this bond. Instead, their per-
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sonal property remained on the premises until the 
first week in March, 1975, at which tine they 
vacated the premises. Amended Findings of Fact 
No. 9, at R 144. While the Andersons remained 
in possession of their office in the 11th East 
commercial property between February 1 and the 
first week in March, 19 75, their only access to the 
office was through Mid Valley which had changed the 
locks and by arrangement with Anderson's counsel, 
would allow access to the office only to remove the 
Andersonfs personal property or to conduct business 
in presence of a representative from Mid Valley. Id. 
About one week after the Andersons vacated the 
office premises, Mid Valley rented them for $310.00 
a month. Testimony of Ross Broadbent, at R 181. At 
the time Mid Valley moved for summary judgment, it I 
also moved for bond forfeiture pursuant to UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 65A(c), and filed an affidavit showing its 
attorney^ fees incurred in defending against the 
temporary restraining order. R 44. 
B. The Plaintiff-Appellant's Statements of 
Fact are Inconsistent with the Facts or Inaccurate in 
the Following Respects: 
Plaintiffs-Appellants state that the total 
i 
i 
i 
l 
i 
I 
i 
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appraised value of their properties was approximately 
$179,000.00 P-App. Brief," at 4. This figure arises 
from Mr. Anderson's Affidavit, R 80, which states that 
it is derived from two attached appraisals. Id. How-
ever, the attached appraisals or, more accurately, 
value findings, are $9 8,950.00 for the 11th East com-
mercial property and $65,950.00 for the 12th Avenue 
home ("plus $5,000" for refrigerated airconditioning 
if installed, but which, concededly was never installed). 
(Value Findings are found in the record between pages 99 
and 100.) This totals only $164,900.00. Furthermore, 
these "appraisals" are based on unsworn documents and 
appear contradicted by Plaintiff-Appellants own brief. 
Compare, P.-App. Brief, at 4 with P.App. Brief, at 24 
(e.g., at 24, "no appraisal was had on the home...."). 
It may also be noted that the "appraisal" of the 11th 
East commercial property states that the "value is 
mostly in the land" and gives the size as 100 x 135 
when, as may be seen from Plaintiffs-Appellants1 own 
complaint, at R 2, the actual size of the property is 
76.5 x 130. Plaintiffs-Appellants correctly state Mid 
Valley's purchase price as $36,750, but omit to state 
that Mid Valley took title subject to substantial first 
mortgages and judgments the total amount of which does 
not appear from the record. Trustee's deed, at R 51; 
(Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 69 (as to 
judgments); Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, . 
at R 61 (as to first mortgages). 
-9-
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Plaintiffs-Appellants state that, after the 
sale, Mr. Anderson met an officer of Mid Valley, 
Merlin Hanks, who made certain representations. P-App. 
Brief, at 6. Mr. Hanks is, in fact, an officer of 
Capitol Thrift. Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 78. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants state that Capitol 
Thrift refused to accept "bids" from Belnap, Doxey, 
Hill and Nelson. P-App. Brief, e.g. at 7. In fact, 
none of these individuals attended the sale or sent 
a bid to the sale. E.g., P.-App. Brief, at 5. Bel-
nap and Doxey never implied that they would put up 
money for the purchase but only that they "might be 
interested." Affidavit of David W. Doxey, at R 65. They 
later concluded that in view of the "perhaps exagger-
ated values imputed to the properties," their "margin 
seemed too thin" and they should make no attempt to 
purchase the property. Id. Hill never contacted 
the trustee and only contacted the beneficiary the day 
after the sale. Affidavit of Larry Hill, at R 88. 
Nelson's cryptic and unsworn statement (to which the 
lower court was not required to give weight) implies 
only that the beneficiary Capitol Thrift still was 
willing to allow the Andersons to redeem their default 
if they could do so with Nelson's help before the time 
of the sale. No bid to buy the property is stated. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Unsworn statement of Barbara M. Nelson,*at R 87. 
The foregoing discrepancies between the 
factual characterization found in Plaintiffs-Appellants1 
Brief and the factual characterization found here are de-
cisively resolved by resort to the record and, in any 
event, create no genuine issue as to any material fact 
as may be seen from the following Argument, 
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.THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE TO THE PRESENT FACTS AND LAW 
The validity of the present trustee's sale, 
reflecting the daily occurrence of similar sales under 
analogous circumstances, is a proper subject for sum-
mary judgment. Such a judgment promotes judicial 
economy while preserving the integrity of the courts 
and of the statutorily delimited trustees1 sales. 
Where the law and the material facts are clear, a fail-
ure to grant summary judgment would be a harsh thing. 
See, e.g. , Burningham v. Ott, 525 P. 2d 620 
(Utah 19 74) (majority and concurring opinions) . 
For reasons of fact and law which follow, those 
facts which are disputed by Plaintiffs-Appellants are 
immaterial and summary judgment should be sustained. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS- APPELLANTS, NOT HAVING DONE EQUITY, 
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF 
The Andersons sought in the trial court the 
equitable relief of invalidating the trustee's sale. 
They were not entitled to this relief as a matter of 
-12-
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law because they failed to do equity. E.g., 30 C.J.S. 
Equity §90(1965). 
In the present circumstance, this rule requires 
the Andersons to do equity by tendering the full payment 
for the property to the trustee before they could prop-
erly seek invalidation of the sale. This rule makes 
sense since (1) invalidation without tender would 
leave the trustee and beneficiary with no satisfaction 
of the debt owed and, (2) unless the trustor could ten-
der, he could not successfully bid at the sale in any 
event, and, therefore, would most probably not be in-
jured by the sale. 
This rule is well established in those juris-
dictions which have considered the question. E.g., 30 
C.J.S. Equity §92 nn. 74.35 and 74.40 (1965), and cases 
cited. California is such a jurisdiction. Thus, where a 
trustor challenged a sale pursuant to a trust deed as 
having been irregular, the California court held, in the I 
alternative, that since the trustor did not tender the 
full amount due, 
1[I]f the said sale be for any reason treated 
as voidable, nevertheless Plaintiff is in no 
event entitled to have the same set aside 
through her own complete failure to do equity.' 
Mack v. Golino 
' 213 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. App. 1950) 
i 
i 
i 
l even if the sale should be regarded as voidable, nevertheless, Plaintiff is in no event entitled 
to have the same set aside through her own 
complete failure to offer to do equity. In j 
the case of Leonard v. Bank, 16 Cal. App. 2d I 
at page 346, 60 P.2d at page 328: 
i 
l 
And in Py v. Pleitner, 161 P.2d 393, 396 (Cal. App. 1945), 1 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court said: "The rule in this state is settled 
that a tender of the indebtedness is a prerequisite 
to a judgment canceling a sale under a trust deed." 
The general question as to what constitutes 
a tender is well discussed by courts and commentators 
and allows of a many-faceted answer. E.g., 74 AM. JUR. 2d 
Tender (1974), and cases cited; . 86 C.J.S. Tender (1954). 
However, one conclusion is clear from the treatises cited: 
the tender must, at the very minimum, be backed up by a 
good faith ability to pay actual value. Thus, in Hyams v. 
Bamburger, 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 302 (1894) , this court noted 
that ordinarily a tender requires the actual production of 
the money to the creditors. Even where a statute requires 
less than that (as the since repealed Utah Statute once 
did, UTAH CODE ANN § 104-54-8 [1943]) the party tender-
ing was required to "have the ability to produce [the 
money],11 and to "act in good faith." Id. , 36 P. at 
203 (dictum) . Cf. , Lilenquist v. Utah State Nat. Bank, 
99 Utah 163, 100 P.2d 185 (1940); LeVine v. Whitehouse, 
37 Utah 228, 109 P. 2 (1910). 
In the present case, the actions of Belnap, 
Doxey and Hill do not amount to a tender for the Ander-
sons since, at most, these men were interested only in 
discussing or considering the purchase of the property 
for themselves (which interest never crystallized). 
Affidavit of David W. Doxey, at R 65; Affidavit of Austin 
Belnap, at R 67; Affidavit of Larry Hill, at R 88-89. 
-14-
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The affidavits of the Andersons state that they 
are "willing" to pay Defendants-Respondents the money they 
"owe" and that this statement "constitutes an official 
tender of money owed." Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at 
R 81; Affidavit of Mrs. Anderson, at R 86. This statement 
is ambiguous as to whether the Andersons intended thereby 
to bring their payments current (which, coming as it did 
after the three month redemption period, was patently 
insufficient) or to pay the sale price of the properties. 
Furthermore, this statement is backed by no showing of a 
good faith ability to pay. It is instead backed by a 
record of many months of default and inability on the 
i 
part of the Andersons to pay their notes to Capitol ^ 
Thrift. Under such circumstances, the Andersons have
 ( 
made no tender. As the California appellate court ' 
stated in Security-First Nat. Bank v. Cryer, 37 Cal. 1 
App. 2d 657, 104 P.2d 66,69 (1940): 
l Surely it cannot be said that upon a trustee's sale under a deed of trust the auctioneer is re-
quired to accept any bid that is made, irres- -
pective of whether the amount of the bid is pro- I 
duced and where no information is forthcoming as . . • . " 
to the financial ability of the bidder. If this 
were true, any debtor could attend a foreclosure 
sale of his property and make any bid he cared to, 
without any intention of actually paying the amount: 
of his bid. The sale then of course, would ahve 
to be held all over again, new notices gotten out, 
etc. If such a procedure were permitted and 
carried to its possible ultimate conclusion, any -
foreclosure sale could be prevented indefinitely. I 
Further, it must be remembered in the instant case * 
that it was necessary to foreclose the two deeds of 
the trust because the trustor, Mr. Cryer, had defaulted 
in his payments upon the notes they secured. Was not 
the trustee's agent at the sale warranted therefore, in 
assuming that if Mr. Cryer were financially responsible 
he would not in the first place have allowed the 
trust deeds to reach a sale on foreclosure: We 
I 
i 
I 
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think so. And indeed, as heretofore pointed out, 
at no time during the proceedings- now under review 
was any attempt made -to assert the financial ability 
of appellant Cryer to pay in cash the amount of 
the bids he proffered. 
Without a more substantial "tender" by the Andersons, 
equitable relief if granted by the lower court would re-
instate the Andersons1 still-uncured defaults, an in-
equitable and unsatisfactory result contravening the 
weight of authority. 
Under these circumstances, the lower court 
was justified in determining as a matter of law that 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, not having done equity, were 
not entitled to equity and summary judgment should have 
been entered, as it was. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS RATIFIED THE DISPUTED SALE 
AND THEREBY WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO CHALLENGE IT 
Trustors ratify a trustee's sale and waive 
any right to challenge it if they, with knowledge of the 
material circumstances, subsequently offer to repurchase 
the property or begin renting the property or take other 
action inconsistent with a claim of title. While there 
appears to be no Utah case law on this point as it 
touches trustee's sales, the principle is well established 
generally. See, e.g., 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §601 at 1051 
(1949); see, especially, Denson v. Davis, 256 N.C. 
658, 124 So. E. 2d 827, 831 (1962) (collecting cases) 
(a trustor who rents or seeks to purchase from purchaser 
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In the present circumstance, the Andersons 
stipulated that the disputed sale could be conducted 
(R 40-42) and then, by their counsel, instructed the 
trustee to consummate the sale and issue a trustee's 
deed to Mid Valley. Affidavit of James B. Mason, at 
R 48. 
Thereafter, the Andersons offered to re-
purchase the properties in the presence of and with 
the advice of counsel. Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou 
Broadbent, at R 60. Affidavit of Ross and Helen 
Broadbent, at R 70. (Note: This repurchase offer is 
amplified by the testimony of Mr. Anderson at the trial 
of the counterclaims in this case. However, that 
testimony was not before the lower court at the summary 
judgment hearing and is therefore not germane to this 
discussion.) 
When their repurchase offer was refused, the 
Andersons entered into a formal rental agreement, drawn 
by their own attorney and executed by all concerned, 
and covering the Anderson properties. Defendant's 
Exhibit I-d and R 24; Amended Finding of Fact No. 4, at 
R 14 3; see, Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at 
R 71; Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at R 60; 
Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 77-78. As a final, 
conclusive gesture of ratification and waiver, the Ander 
sons paid to Mid Valley the first month's rent due under 
the rental agreement. Affidavit of Ross and Helen 
Broadbent, at R 71. 
-17- - .' 
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The Andersons1. clear cut ratification of the 
now-disputed sale constitutes a waiver of any right to 
challenge it and, as a matter of law, again validates 
the lower court's entry of summary judgment against them. 
E.g., Denson v. Davis, supra. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MID VALLEY WAS A BONA FIDE 
PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE WHOSE 
TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES CANNOT NOW BE INVALIDATED 
Mid Valley was a bona fide purchaser of the 
Anderson properties for value without notice. This fact 
was argued to the lower court, R 36, was unchallenged by 
the Andersons in the lower court and is not now at issue. 
The record shows without contradiction that Mid Valley 
purchased for value without actual or constructive notice 
of any defect in the sale. E.g., Affidavit of Ross and 
Helen Broadbent, at R 69. As such a purchaser, Mid Val-
ley's title to the properties is not now subject to 
successful attack by the Andersons. 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28(1), the recitals 
of statutory compliance in the trustee's deed, R 51, are 
conclusive evidence thereof in favor of Mid Valley as a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice. As a 
result, the Andersons1 attack on the sale, as against Mid 
Valley, simply fails, as a matter of law. 
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Furthermore, the case law—in addition to the 
conclusive Utah statute—strongly suggests that any 
peccadillo (or larger transgression) committed by the 
trustee in the course of the sale must be answered in 
damages by the trustee and should not affect Mid Valley's 
title. In Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P. 
2d 135, 138-39 (1948) the Court announced the rule that 
the beneficiary to a trust cannot reclaim trust property 
(in that case real property) in the hands of a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice. See, also, 76 AM. 
jJUR. 2d Trusts §269 (1975). In Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 
2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957), the Court reiterated this 
rule in the context of disputed mining claims. See also, 
e.g., Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122 (1888); Zier v. . j 
Osten, 135 Mont. 484, 342 P.2d 1076 (1959); Dodge v. 
Stone, 76 R.I. 318, 69 A.2d 632 (1949). 
By strict analogy this rule limits the trustor's 
i 
] 
i 
as well as the beneficiary's recourse to the property since 
the trustor's legal right to the trust property after 
his uncured default certainly does not exceed the inter-
est of the beneficiary. Thus, when this Court considered | 
a motion to set aside a mortgage sale, it noted with care 
that the motion preceded the expiration of the redemption 
period and was part of the original foreclosure suit, 
thereby establishing by implication that the vested title 
of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice was 
not affected by the motion. Skeen v. Pratt, 8 7 Utah 121, 
i 
i 
i 
i 
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48 P. 2d 457, 453 (1935)
 v 
The effect of the rule, as adopted by other 
states, is that the title of.a purchaser such as Mid 
Valley cannot now be voided by the Andersons. E.g. , 
Donovan v. Frick, 458 S.W. 2d 282 (Mo. 1970); Dugan v. Man-
chester Federal Savings & Loan Assn. , 92 N.H. 44, 23 A. 
2d 873 (1942)? Pi Nola v. Allison, 143 Cal. 106, 76 P. 
976 (1904); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §601a and n. 70 at 1051 
(1949) . Indeed, this Defendant-Respondent has found no 
case whose facts reveal the invallidation of the vested 
title of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
at a trustee's sale. Instead, trustor's in the circum-
stance of the Andersons should look if at all, to the 
trustee for relief in damages. 
As a result, summary judgment in favor of Mid 
Valley was correctly entered by the lower court. 
POINT V . 
THE DISPUTED TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS IN ALL 
MATERIAL RESPECTS PROPERLY CONDUCTED 
A - Defendant-Respondent Mid Valley's Payment 
Within 24 Hours of the Sale was "forthwith" under 
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28 and, in any Event, is not Sub-
ject to Challenge by Plaintiffs-Appellants Who Were 
Not Injured by Any Delay. 
As the record shows without dispute, Mid 
Valley, the only outside bidder, appeared at the Jan-
uary 16, 19 75, trustee's sale and placed the highest 
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bid, whereupon the properties were declared "sold11 to 
Mid Valley. E.g. , Affidavit of James B. Mason, at R 
46-48. Mid Valley and the trustee, having spoken 
earlier on the subject, then agreed that full payment 
could be made within 24 hours, which it was. E.g., id.; 
Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, at R 69-70. This 
typical procedure in no way invalidates the sale since 
the term "forthwith" in the context of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§57-1-28 comprehends a reasonable, 24-hour opportunity 
to pay if the trustee so allows. 
A bidder cannot reasonably be expected to 
carry cash or cashier's check in the exact amount needed 
since the sum of the highest bid cannot be known in 
advance. Indeed, this fact is understood and anticipated 
by UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-2 7 which allows the trustee to 
resell the property following a sale in which the high 
bidder could not or did not produce money in the amount 
of his bid, taxing the added expense to that bidder. If I 
the law anticipated instantaneous payment before the con-
clusion of the auction sale, there would be little 
need for the resale provision. And UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28 
requires the trustee to execute and deliver his deed "upon 
the receipt of payment," suggesting some opportunity for I 
filling out the deed in an orderly fashion after the sale 
and before money and deed change hands. See, First 
Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Sharp, 347 S.W.2d 337 
(1961), rehearing denied, 359 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App. 1962) 
(a cash sale is a sale concurrent with delivery of the I 
deed which delivery may follow the auction by hours or __ 
i 
i 
i 
I 
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days)• * 
The courts of other jurisdictions in inter-
preting sales statutes requiring payment "forthwith" 
have recognized the practical wisdom in interpreting such 
provisions to allow a reasonable time to produce the 
money. In Williams v. Continental Securities Corporation, 
22 Wash. 1, 153 P.2d 847 (1944) the court in interpreting 
the forthwith payment required by statute at a sheriff's 
sale said: 
In the instant case, it could not have been 
expected that the parties interested in pur-
chasing the property would have $33,000 or more 
in their pockets at the place of sale; and, 
since there was to be competitive bidding, no 
one could tell just how much would be required 
of the successful bidder. It was therefore 
proper for the deputy sheriff to allow the 
appellant, as the highest bidder, a reasonable 
time to produce the amount of his bid. What 
was a reasonable time would necessarily depend 
upon the circumstances. 
Id., 153 P.2d at 854. 
In accord are Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Scott, 106 
Minn. 32, 119 N.W. 391 (1908); Leavitt v. S.D. Mercer Co., 
64 Neb. 31, 89 N.W. 426 (1902). 
In determining the limits of a "reasonable time" 
for payment, the courts have affirmed the judgment of the 
trustee or sheriff unless obviously unreasonable. Thus, 
in Williams v. Continental Securities, supra, where the 
sheriff decided to wait less than one hour for payment, 
the court sustained the sheriff, noting that he is vested 
with powers to evaluate bids and to allow a reasonable 
time to make the bid good. 153 P.2d at 855. The court 
added, however, t h a t a period of more than one hour, ex-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tending into the next day, might also be reasonable 
under proper circumstances. 153 P.2d at 854; see, 
Minnesota Debenture v. Scott, supra (payment the day 
following sale allowed). It is additionally noted that 
a trustee1s judgment as to the payment time affects only 
the creditor-beneficiary and may well be flexible within 
the requirements of the creditor-beneficiary, while the 
sheriff1s judgment may be fettered by the state's in-
terest in receiving its tax lien revenue, or etc. 
In the present circumstance, the trustee, 
after conferring with the bidder (R 59,69), determined 
that a reasonable time acceptable to the creditor-
beneficiary in which to allow an out-of-town bidder to 
make its payment would at least encompass 24 hours (the 
actual payment time). In the instant case, this is not 
as a matter of law an unreasonably long period of time 
to allow payment and is consistent with the statutory 
requirement of "forthwith" payment. 
A review of Plaintiffs-Appellants' citations 
on the question of "forthwith" payment leaves the fore-
going conclusion unrebutted. 
In P-App. Brief, at 13, the Andersons quote 
(actually paraphrase) Application of County Collector, 
266 N.E.2d 383, 387 (111. App. 1970) to the effect that 
the term "forthwith" as used in the Illinois Revenue Act 
to describe payment at a tax sale "means that purchaser 
at a tax sale must make payment on date of sale." How-
ever, as noted above, the interest by the state in im-
mediate payment at tax sales is not present in the in-
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stant case. More importantly, perhaps, the court in 
County.Collector reached its result "in accord with the 
reasoning and result of Hoffmann v. Stuckslager." 266 
N.E.2d at 387. The Hoffman case, which like County 
Collector was the product of an Illinois intermediate 
appeals court, was reversed by the Illinois Supreme 
Court and with it the "reasoning and result" of the 
County Collector case was overturned. Hoffman v. 
Stuckslager, 48 111.2d 262,269 N.E.2d 501 (1971). The 
Illinois Supreme Court first cited Illinois precedents 
to the effect that "forthwith" implies a reasonable time 
for payment, then rejected these precedents since the 
Illinois Revenue Act has now been amended td require the 
tax sales price to be "paid in cash at the time of sale." 
269 N.E.2d at 504. The court next reversed Stucklager 
stating: 
So far as an owner of delinquent property is 
concerned, it is sufficient to conclude... 
that the provisions for payment are directory 
and do not afford a basis for an attack upon the 
validity of the sale. 
269 N.E.2d at 504. 
Thus, in Illinois, "forthwith" when coupled with the 
phrase "paid in cash at the time of sale" means immediate 
payment but is directory so far as a property owner is 
concerned and affords no basis for an attack upon the 
validity of the sale. 
Each of the Andersons1 other citations to the 
effect that "forthwith" means "immediate" deal with 
circumstances distantly related to the present. 
Dettmer v. Mayo, 61 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1952) P-App. Brief, at 
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13/ (prisoner delivered by sheriff from jail to prison 
after a three-month delay is not "forthwith"); Bottle 
Mining and Milling Co, v, Kern, 9 Cal. App. 527, 99 P. 
994 (1908), P-App. Brief, at 14, (notice of assessment 
of corporate shares sufficient if given upon the making 
of corporate resolution); Lewis v. Hojer, 16 N.Y.S. 534 
(Comm. Pleas 1891), P-App. Brief, at 14, (19 days is 
reasonable time to ship cigars from Florida to New 
York); Sheldon v. Steele, 114 Iowa 616, 87 N.W. 683 
(1901), P-App. Brief, at 14, (suit by County Treasurer 
against alleged property purchaser; payment delay from 
December 6, to last of December not "forthwith"). The 
decision in Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 80 Ariz. 368, 298 
P.2d 789 (1956), ("forthwith" docket entries should be 
immediate) relied on by the Andersons, P-App. Brief, at 
14, was altered dramatically on rehearing, 81 Ariz. 104, 
301 P.2d 757 (1956) (docket entry made one or two days 
after court's order constitutes a valid starting date 
from which the time of appeal runs). 
The foregoing citations by the Andersons lend 
no weight to their argument. Payment by Mid Valley was 
"forthwith" within the intent and meaning of the Statute. 
Finally, even if Mid Valley's payment had not 
been "forthwith," this would not constitute an irregularity 
about which the Andersons could complain. Hoffman v. 
Stuckslager, Supra, 269 N.E.2d at 504. The statutory pro-
vision is for the benefit of the creditor-beneficiary ac-
cording to authority from other jurisdictions and a pay-
ment delay following a sale does not affect the Habf of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an owner in default. See, id. ; cf. , Py v. Pleitner, 
161 P.2d 393 (Cal. App. 1945) (trustee may even accept 
a note from highest bidder in lieu of cash); Admiral 
Co. v. ' Thomas, 164 F. Supp* 569 (D.D.C. 1958) ; Smith v. 
Deeson, 14 So. 40 (Miss. 1893) 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §576b(2) 
at 971 (provisions for cash sale benefit the creditor 
[or beneficiary] enabling him to have his money 
speedily and an agreement to postpone payment gives 
the mortgagor [or trustor] no right to complain); §579 
at 9 82 (19 49) (statutory requirement of cash deposit 
by highest bidder at the time of sale may also be 
waived by trustee or officer). 
B - The Disputed Sale Occurred on the Date 
Noticed. It was not Unlawfully Postponed. 
The Andersons argue that there exists a dis-
pute as to whether the sale was postponed from noon 
January 16, to the forenoon of January 17, 19 75, when 
Mid Valley paid for the properties. 
There exists no contradiction in the record as 
to when the sale was noticed and held. The single, and 
not unusual fact that Mid Valley paid almost 24 hours 
later creates no genuine issue as to the date of the 
sale in light of the legitimacy of that payment as 
argued in the foregoing section. 
Furthermore, the trustee's deed to Mid Valley 
(R 50-51) affirmatively recites that the sale was proper 
in respect of notice and other areas of compliance with 
the applicable statute. Under UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-28(1), 
these recitals are conclusive in favor of Mid Valley Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which, as evidenced by the Broadbent affidavits (R 58,69) 
and as conclusively established by the absence of any 
argument to the contrary in the lower court, is a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice. Therefore, 
there exists no material or genuine issue as to whether 
the sale was properly held without postponement. 
C - Notice Requiring Cash Payment at the Time 
of Sale Neither Invalidates the Sale nor Renders it Unfair. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants assert the invalidity or 
unfairness of the disputed sale because the sale notice 
said the sale would be for cash when, in fact, Mid 
Valley was allowed to make payment the morning following 
the sale. P-App. Brief at 16-23. The unfairness arises, 
according to the Andersons, because: the trustee's 
cash-only notice discouraged potential bidders who could 
not pay cash but who could have entered valid bids pay-
able within 24 hours. This argument does not withstand 
scrutiny. 
A cash sale is one in which cash is paid by 
the time the deed is delivered which may occur well after 
the sale. A delay of a few days even will not be regarded 
as extending credit. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. 
v. Sharp, supra, 347 S.W.2d at 340, 341; 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages §576b (3) at 972 (1949). Furthermore, a trustor 
or mortgagor cannot complain if a beneficiary or creditor 
who is entitled to cash allows instead extra time for pay-
ment since the cash sale provision of most trust and 
mortgage documents is only for the benefit of the bene-
ficiary or creditor and does not concern the* f-m.Q*-r>r- *^-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in the instant case may actually have benefitted the 
Andersons as the following reasoning demonstrates. 
At the time of the sale, the trustee agreed 
to accept later payment from the high bidder, as well 
he lawfully might. See, POINT V A supra; Hoffmann v. 
Stuckslager, supra; Py v. Pleitner, supra; First 
Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Sharp, supra; Admiral 
Co. v. Thomas, supra; Smith v. Deeson, supra; cf., 
Hill v. Gibralter Savings & Loan Association, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 188, (Cal. App. 1967); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §576b (2), 
(3) (1949). Under the instant facts, this resulted in no 
dispersal of impatient cash bidders (as feared by the 
Kleckner court) because the only other bidder present 
was Capitol Thrift. And the high bidder, Mid Valley, 
actually made good on its bid by paying within the time 
allowed by the trustee. The effect is a net benefit to 
the Andersons because the trustee, by allowing payment in 
24 hours was able to accept and be paid the highest bid. 
As a matter of law, there is no unfairness to 
the Andersons. Indeed, a ruling by this court to the 
effect that trustees must require immediate cash pay-
ment if they post notice of a cash sale, would most 
probably be to the detriment of trustors such as the 
Andersons. In such an event, the trustee would probably 
continue to post a cash sale notice in order to conform 
to the provisions of the customary trust agreement forms 
and in order to avoid unwanted payment delays, and would 
then, by the Andersons1 tortured reasoning, be obligated 
to insist on cash bids for immediate (not "fnrt-iwi +h"\ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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payment to the exclusion of all other, higher bids. 
D
 ~ The Disputed Sale was Fair in All Other 
Respects. The sale of the Anderson properties was not 
done in a corner. The Andersons received the close ad-
vice of counsel at all stages as documented by the 
Supplemental Statement of Facts. Capitol Thrift and 
the trustee worked for months with the Andersons in an 
effort to help them cure their defaults—event to the 
extent of stipulating to the cancellation of a scheduled 
sale on the condition that the Andersons bring their 
obligations current (which they, even then, failed to 
do). R 40-42. Thereafter, Capitol Thrift entertained 
numerous schemes and proposals of the Andersons to 
cure their default, as shown by the Andersons1 affidavits, 
even though the statutory period for redemption had long 
since lapsed. Now, the Andersons attack the sale claiming 
that the very accommodations made by Capitol Thrift and 
the trustee are grounds for voiding the sale. Such a 
result as that requested by the Andersons would not only 
cool the cooperation of future trustees and beneficiaries, 
but would be, as a matter of law, incorrect. 
First, the Andersons argue that a Barbara M. 
Nelson made an "offer to pay Plaintiffs1 findebtedness'" 
on the morning of January 16, 1975. In the first place, 
this statement in the affidavit of Mrs. Anderson is 
totally devoid of any suggestion as to her competence 
to testify on this point. R 84. The only suggestion 
as to her source for this information is the unsworn 
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statement of Mrs. Nelson. R 87. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e) 
requires that affidavits opposing summary judgment "shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein." Mrs. Anderson's affi-
davit meets none of these prerequisites and Mrs. Nelson's 
unsworn statement fails of even threshold admissibility. 
Where an insufficient affidavit is not the subject of a 
motion to strike, a party may not complain on appeal that 
it was improperly considered by the court. Howick v. 
Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972). 
If*the rule were otherwise, judicial economy would be 
undermined. However, the lower court may and should 
ignore insufficient affidavits regardless of any motion 
to strike and, when it does so, the appellate court 
should not disturb its proper decision. Preston v. Lamb, 
20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1968) ("...the trial 
judge would not be reversed in ignoring [an inadmissible 
part of an affidavit] even if it tended to support the 
allegations of Plaintiff's complaint...."); 6 MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1(56.22 [1] at 2803 and n. 17, at 2817-
19 (1974 and 1974 Supp. at n.17). If the rule were other 
wise, judicial economy would be undermined. Thus the 
lower court was justified in entering summary judgment 
without regard to these materials. Furthermore, this 
alleged offer is at most ambiguous as to whether a 
. tardy "cure" of default or a property purchase was in-
tended and came at a time (the mornina of th^ ^ ^ ^ Mhfln Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Andersons no longer had a statutory right to re-
deem and any accommodating redemption attempt allowed by 
Capitol Thrift and the trustee would have to be im-
mediate to avoid another postponement of the sale. Fin-
ally , this alleged offer was communicated to Capitol 
Thrift who at that late date had no legal or equitable 
obligation to accommodate the Andersons, The trustee, 
who is charged with conducting a fair sale, never re-
ceived this alleged offer at all, so far as the record 
shows. No unfairness results from this alleged occur-
rence. 
Second, the Andersons argue that Capitol 
Thrift agreed on January 9, 1975, to allow them to cure 
their default. Affidavit of Mrs. Anderson, ± R 84-85. 
Once again, Capitol Thrift was under no legal or equit-
able obligation to allow cure, the trustee was not 
involved and no money changed hands. Furthermore, the 
Andersons can hardly be heard to say that they were not 
aware that the sale was being held, in any event, since 
they were advised by their own attorney on the point. 
Affidavit of Mr. Anderson, at R 78. Under these cir-
cumstances, no unfairness occurred. 
Third, the Andersons propose that they were 
disadvantaged because Hill, Doxey and Belnap were not 
allowed to bid on the properties. However, Hill never 
contacted the trustee and only contacted Capitol Thrift 
the day after the sale. He made no appearance at the 
sale. Affidavit of Larry Hill at R 88-89. Doxey and 
Belnap were also not interferred with by the trustee or Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Capitol Thrift with regard to any aspect of the sale. 
Doxey and Belnap simply decided on their own not to 
get involved. Affidavit of David W. Doxey, at R 65. 
Affidavit of H. Austin Belnap, at R 67. 
In light of the foregoing, the claim that 
the sale price obtained for the property was depressed 
by the conduct of Capitol Thrift and the trustee fails . 
as a matter of law. It is additionally noted that no 
genuine factual issue as to the adequacy of the sale 
price was raised by the Andersons before the lower court. 
There is no dispute as to the value of the properties, 
except as the Andersons.dispute it among themselves 
based on unsworn "value findings" and hearsay. Compare 
P-App. Brief, at 24, with P.App. Brief, at 4. There is 
also no dispute as to the price paid by Mid Valley, or 
to the fact that they assumed first mortgages on the 
property as well as unsatisfied judgments. Trustee's 
deed, at R 51 Affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent, 
at R 73. Affidavit of Roy and Mary Lou Broadbent, at 
R 61. The Andersons simply failed to determine or allege 
by affidavit the difference between the appraised value 
of the properties and the price paid for the properties 
by Mid Valley together with the amount of encumbrances 
assumed. Neither did the Andersons allege by affidavit 
even generally a purchase price deficiency. 
On balance, the lower court could properly 
conclude, as a matter of law, that neither trustee nor-
Capitol Thrift compromised the integrity of the sale by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discouraging bids or by any other conduct. 
E -In any Event, the Alleged Sale Irregularities 
are Insufficient to Affect the Sale. 
A trustee's sale should not be disturbed for 
light or trivial reasons. Meux v. Trexvant, 132 Cal. 
487, 64 P. 848, 849 (1909). Indeed, fraud, collusion or 
gross irregularity coupled with injury to the complain-
ant must be affirmatively shown. E.g., Brown v. Busch, 
152 Cal. App. 2d 200, 313 P.2d 19 (1957); 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages §601b (1949); 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages 
§§829, 831 (1971). The difficulty of meeting this 
burden is demonstrated by the fact that the disputed 
sales were upheld in each of the cases cited by Plaintiffs-
Appellants for the proposition that gross inadequacy of 
price coupled with some other irregularity constitutes 
grounds for invalidation. P. App. Brief, at 24-26; 
Nevada Land and Mortgage Co. v. Hidden Wells Ranch, Inc., 
83 Nev. 501, 435 P.2d 198 (1968); Crofoot v. Tarman, 
147 Cal. App. 2d 443, 305 P.2d 56 (1957); Foge v. Schmidt, 
101 Cal. App. 681, 226 P.2d 73 (1951). As seen from the 
earlier discussion, Plaintiffs-Appellants make no support-
able claim of fraud, collusion, gross irregularities or 
mistake coupled with prejudice to them sufficient to 
affect the disputed sale. And, as seen from POINT IV, 
above, Plaintiffs-Appellants can in no event disturb 
Mid Valley's title to the properties by a showing of 
irregularity which does not involve Mid Valley. 
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POINT VI 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED 
The trustee's sale disputed by Plaintiffs-
Appellants came only after many months of their default, 
after the cancellation of one sale and after the entire 
transaction had been scrutinized by their counsel. 
The sale was held upon the stipulation of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants that it might go forward. It was 
consummated by the issuance of a trustee's deed to Mid 
Valley only after counsel to Plaintiffs-Appellants ad-
vised the trustee to do so. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs-
Appellants offered to repurchase the properties from 
Mid Valley and, upon refusal of the offer, entered into 
an agreement to rent the properties from Mid Valley, 
paying the first month's rent. Therefore, Plaintiffs-
Appellants ratified the sale and waived any right to 
challenge it. -
Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to do equity by 
a valid tender of purchase price of the properties and, 
therefore, were foreclosed from the equitable relief 
they sought. * 
Mid Valley is a bona-fide purchaser for value 
without notice against whom the sale cannot be invalidated. 
The disputed facts claimed by Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants as material are immaterial because they do not 
concern cognizable sale irregularities and because, as 
a matter of law, summary judgment was properly granted 
based upon each, or any, of the forecroinn nn-ir»4-o Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Therefore, the lower court's entry of Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
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THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED MID VALLEY'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS RESPECTING UNLAWFUL DETAINER OF THE 
11th EAST COMMERCIAL PROPERTY AND BOND FORFEITURE 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ANDERSONS WERE IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER OF THE 
11th EAST COMMERCIAL PROPERTY 
A - Under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-36-3(1) No Notice 
was Required to Create the Circumstance of Unlawful 
Detainer and Amended Conclusion of Law 3 is Erroneous, 
The evidence at trial was undisputed that the 
Andersons and Mid Valley executed Exhibit I-d. Amended 
Findings of Fact No. 4, at R 143. The document is in 
the handwriting of Andersons1 counsel who advised them 
with regard to it. R 174-76. The document is clearly 
binding on the parties. 
With regard to the 11th East commercial property 
the document provided for a two-week term of occupancy for 
the Andersons, that term to conclude January 31, 19 75. 
In view of the entry of summary judgment against the 
Andersons on the question of property ownership, the 
conclusion seems clear that during this two week period, 
the Andersons were tenants of Mid Valley for a specific 
term. As to the unlawful detainer of tenants for a 
specific term, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-36-3(1) provides: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by 
tenant for term less than life.—. 
A tenant of real property, for a term less 
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(1) When he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part 
thereof, after the expiration of the term for 
which it is let to him. In all cases where 
real property is leased for a specified term 
or period, the tenancy shall be terminated with-
out notice at the expiration of such specified 
term or period; 
By the clear meaning of the statute, no notice 
was required to place the Andersons in unlawful detainer. 
Although no Utah cases construing this provision have 
been found, cases in other jurisdictions support the 
principle that no notice to a tenant for a specific term 
is required to establish unlawful detainer. E.g., Smith 
v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935); Beach 
Realty Co. v. City, 105 N.J.L. 317, 144 A.720 (1929); 
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 304 (1929); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 212 
(1935). 
That Mid Valley neither by action nor aquiescence 
implied the continuation of the Andersons1 tenancy, is 
clear from the record. R 178-81. That a tenancy at will 
does not automatically obtain at the end of a lease for 
a specific term is clear from the statute and the cases. 
Thus the court's conclusion that notice was defective 
is erroneous. 
B - The Andersons' Continued Possession of the 
11th East Commercial Property was Authorized by Restrain-
ing Order for a Period of Eight Days Only. Amended Con-
clusion of Law 4, and Amended Findings of Fact 7 and 8 
are in Part Erroneous. 
The facts are that the Andersons retained pos-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
session of the 11th East commercial property after 
January 31, 1975, by their failure to remove their 
belongings from the premises until the first week in 
March, 19 75. Amended Finding of Fact No. 9. Amended 
Conclusion of Law No. 2 to the effect that the Ander-
sons continued to hold possession of the premises has 
not been appealed from and is supported by the case law. 
E.g., Cohen v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 
(Cal. App. 1967) (Failure of real parties in interest 
to remove their equipment from premises "may constitute 
a holding over which deprives the landlord of his right 
to possession."). This continued possession lasted for 
more than a month but was authorized by court order 
for an eight day period only. 
The lower court's injunctive orders are in the 
record and speak for themselves. R 10-11, 13-14. The 
initial temporary restraining order affecting the 11th 
East commercial property was dated February 10, 1975. 
It expired by law no longer than ten days after issuance 
and, in this case, eight days after issuance since it 
was then, on February 18, 19 75, superseded by the court's 
further order. The court's further order (in the nature 
of a preliminary injunction) did not make "permanent" the 
initial temporary restraining order. In the first 
place, by its terms the new order was, at most, pendente 
lite. More importantly, the new order, sofar as it en-
joined Mid Valley was made to "take effect upon the post-
ing and filing by the Plaintiffs of a $7,500.00 corpor-
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ate or cash bond " R 13-14. This bond was 
never posted or filed and the new order, by its own 
terms, never took effect. Amended Finding of Fact No. 
9, R 144. 
Therefore, prior to February 10, 1975, and 
following February 18, 19 75, there was neither a tempor-
ary restraining order nor preliminary injunction nor 
any other judicial restraint which would protect the 
Andersons from unlawful detainer status. 
C — Neither the Andersons' Honest Belief That 
They Owned the 11th East Commercial Property, Nor Their 
Litigation of That Question Protects the Andersons From 
Unlawful Detainer Status. Amended Conclusions of Law 
1 and 2 are erroneous. 
Amended Conclusions of Law 1 and 2 and Paragraph 
of the lower court's Memorandum Decision, R 10 3, suggest 
that unlawful detainer is unavailable to Mid Valley be-
cause the Andersons were in good faith litigating the 
question of ownership of the 11th East commercial property. 
This reasoning is unsupported in law and would lead to 
the untoward conclusion that any tenant, by making a claim, 
counterclaim or defense against his landlord, could auto-
matically minimize his exposure to an unlawful detainer 
action. 
It has long since been established in this 
State that unlawful detainer is available to the vendor 
of real property against the vendee (circumstances 
closely analogous to the present). E.g., Forrester v. 
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P 206 (1930). Obviouslv. in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
litigation by the vendor against the vendee for unlaw-
ful detainer, the vendee will most often defend on the 
ground that his possession is lawful. Such was the 
case in Cook, This Court has never held such a good 
faith, but unsuccessful, defense to preclude a finding 
of unlawful detainer. 
Indeed, in the controlling case of Tanner v. 
Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, rehearing granted, 
6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957), the Court held 
squarely that unlawful detainer was available to the 
prevailing party despite a defendant's unsuccessful 
claim of ownership. There Tanner claimed ownership of 
the property by virtue of his redemption of it from a 
sheriff's sale. A defendant and counterclaimant Reichert 
also claimed ownership of the property, establishing that 
he had received an assignment of the sheriff's certifi-
cate of sale from the original purchaser at the sheriff's 
sale. Ultimately, the Court declared Tanner the owner 
of the property and held Reichert to be in unlawful de-
tainer (through his tenant) for a substantial period be-
fore judgment. In so holding, the Court said at 305 P.2d 
at 887: 
[A] person appearing in this kind of case and 
asserting that the actual occupant is rightfully 
in possession as his tenant will be subject to a 
personal judgment against him for treble damages 
if the court decides his claim is invalid. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
In view of the foregoing, the Andersons' good 
faith litigation of the question of title to the 11th, 
East commercial property does not affect their unlawful 
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detainer status and the conclusions suggesting it does 
are erroneous. 
D - The Fair Rental Value of the 11th East 
Commercial Property was $310.00 a month. 
Mid Valley's agent Ross Broadbent testified 
without contradiction that about one week after the 
Andersons voluntarily vacated the 11th East commercial 
property (the first week in March), Mid Valley rented 
the premises for $310.00 a month. R 181. Mr. Broadbent 
further testified that, in his experience, this was a 
fair rental value. R 181-82. And, in any event, an 
owner is competent to testify as to the value of his 
property. In the absence of any testimony or evidence 
to the contrary, this evidence is sufficient to establish 
conclusively the fair rental value of the premises. 
This fair rental value may be used in computing treble 
damages in the present circumstance where no rent is 
specified in the occupancy agreement. See, Forrester 
v. Cook, Supra, 292 P. at 214. 
E - Mid Valley is Entitled to Damages for Un-
lawful Detainer in the Amount of $660.00. 
The Andersons1 possession of the 11th East 
commercial property constituted unlawful detainer from 
the date of the termination of the occupancy agreement, 
January 31, 19 75, until the first week in March, 19 75, 
less the eight days during which the temporary restrain-
ing order protected the Andersons in their possession 
of the premises. Since the fair market value of the 
premises is $310.00 a month, or approximately $11.00 for 
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each day in February, and since the Andersons were in 
unlawful detainer for 20 days, they are liable to Mid 
Valley in the sum of $220•00 which trebled is $660.00. 
POINT II 
AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW 7 IS ERRONEOUS 
AND THE ANDERSONS SHOULD FORFEIT THEIR $300.00 BOND 
TO MID VALLEY 
On February 10f 19 75, a temporary restraining 
order was signed against Mid Valley enjoining it from 
occupying the 11th East commercial property. Pursuant 
to this order, the Andersons, as their own sureties, 
posted bond in the amount of $300.00. Amended Findings 
of Fact No. 9, at R 144. This order remained in effect 
until February 18, 19 75. 
For the reasons cited above in support of the 
entry of summary judgment by the lower court in favor 
of Mid Valley, Mid Valley was at all relevant times 
rightfully entitled to occupy the 11th East commercial 
property and the temporary restraining order operated 
as a wrongful restraint upon it. Therefore, pursuant 
to UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c), Mid Valley is entitled to 
forfeiture in its favor of the Andersonsf bond in the 
amount of its resulting injury. 
Attorneys1 fees incurred as a result of the 
wrongful restraint amount to more than the amount of the 
bond as shown by the affidavit of Ralph R. Mabey. R 44. 
Because Rule 6 5A(c) instructs Mid Valley to seek bond 
forfeiture upon motion, the affidavit which was submitted Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law School, BYU. 
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pursuant to Mid Valley's motion for bond forfeiture is 
competent. UTAH R. CIV. P. 43 (e). Furthermore, the 
attorneys1 fees established by the affidavit are 
cognizable as injury to Mid Valley resulting from the 
wrongful restraint. E.g., Coggins v. Wright, 22 Ariz. 
App. 217, 526 P.2d 741, 743 (1974) (well recognized that 
attorney's fees required for procuring dissolution of 
wrongful injunction constitute recoverable damages); 
Annot.r 55 A.L.R. 454 (1928). 
In addition to its attorneys' fees, Mid Valley 
was injured by the wrongful restraint in the amount of 
the daily rental value of the premises times eight days. 
The daily rental value, deduced from the foregoing 
materials, is approximately $11.00. Thus, Mid Valley 
was damaged in the amount of $8 8.00 in lost rentals. 
Since the amount of Mid Valley's injury re-
sulting from the wrongful restraint exceeds the amount 
of the bond, Mid Valley is entitled to forfeiture in its 
favor of the entire $300.00 bond. 
POINT III 
CONCLUSION: MID VALLEY IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
AND BOND FORFEITURE IN ITS FAVOR 
The lower court's refusal to declare the 
Andersons in unlawful detainer of the 11th East com-
mercial property during the month of February, 19 75, 
less eight days, and its refusal to assess damages for 
that unlawful detainer in the amount of $660.00, should 
-44-
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be reversed with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of Mid Valley in the amount of $660.00. 
Likewise, the lower court's refusal to 
grant bond forfeiture to Mid Valley in the amount of 
$300.00 should be reversed with instructions to 
effect the bond forfeiture. 
-4R-
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